06 July 1999

TEXT: STATE DEPT. REPORT ON ACCIDENTAL BOMBING OF CHINESE EMBASSY

Following is the text of the release and Ambassador Pickering's oral
presentation:

(begin text)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release July 6, 1999

STATEMENT BY JAMES B. FOLEY, DEPUTY SPOKESMAN

CHINA - RELEASE ON ACCIDENTAL BOMBING

Following briefings of Congressional members and staff, the State
Department today is releasing the text of the June 17 oral
presentation made by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Thomas R. Pickering to the Government of the People's Republic of
China (PRC), conveying information compiled by the intelligence
community and the Department of Defense regarding how the accidental
bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade came to occur. We appreciate
the cooperation of the agencies that provided the material for
Ambassador Pickering's presentation.


ORAL PRESENTATION BY
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE THOMAS PICKERING ON JUNE 17
TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REGARDING THE ACCIDENTAL BOMBING OF 
THE PRC EMBASSY IN BELGRADE

RELEASED JULY 6, 1999


-- I am here at the instruction of President Clinton as his personal
envoy. He has asked me to deliver a letter from him to President
Jiang; to present the official report of our investigation into the
accidental bombing of your embassy in Belgrade; and to answer any
questions you may have about the report. My remarks and comments will
constitute a full report to you.

-- The attack was a mistake. Our examination explains how a series of
errors and omissions led to that mistake. Let me emphasize: no one
targeted the Chinese Embassy. No one, at any stage in the process,
realized that our bombs were aimed at the Chinese Embassy.

-- It is entirely appropriate that we provide you with an explanation
of how this awful tragedy occurred. The U.S. government recognizes our
responsibility to provide a full explanation. We have undertaken our
own internal investigation into this matter and want to share our
results with you.

-- I have brought with me a high-level delegation of representatives
from the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, and
the Intelligence Community.

-- The delegation includes officials who have been directly involved
in the investigation and the preparation of the report. Let me
introduce them.

-- With me here today are Ambassador James Sasser; Mr. James Simon,
the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration; Mr.
Franklin Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs; Mr. Jeremy Clark, Deputy Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency; Dr. Susan Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Mr. James Keith,
Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.

-- My intention is to provide information and explanation as we
proceed. We will also show you some charts and photos to help
illustrate some of the basic results of our investigation. After that,
we will turn to providing answers to your questions.

Introduction:

-- First let me express the heartfelt condolences of the American
people and government to the families of the three Chinese journalists
who died in the bombing of your Embassy in Belgrade on May 7th. Let me
convey also our sympathy for the 20 Embassy staff members who were
injured. We realize that no amount of explanation will make up for the
personal tragedy suffered by these individuals and their loved ones.

-- I am here, as you know, to provide the explanation and the
investigation report in fulfillment of President Clinton's comments in
his telephone conversation and letters to President Jiang.

-- I want to underline that this report has been prepared by senior
U.S. Government officials from our intelligence and military
organizations.

-- The report shows that multiple factors and errors in several parts
of the U.S. Government were responsible for the mistaken bombing.
Beginning as early as 1997, mistakes in different parts of our
government contributed to this tragic set of errors; and our
operational procedures failed to catch these errors.

-- The CIA and Defense Department are continuing to interview
individuals in the field who were involved in various aspects of the
decisions that led to the bombing. Because the NATO air campaign has
only just concluded, it has not been possible to debrief fully every
person involved and to reach conclusions regarding responsibility for
mistakes that led to the bombing. The Director of Central
Intelligence, who is also Chief of the Intelligence Community, has
directed the conduct of an accountability review which will go into
the issue of responsibility, the appropriate results of which will be
made available.

-- The bombing resulted from three basic failures. First, the
technique used to locate the intended target - the headquarters of the
Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP) - was
severely flawed. Second, none of the military or intelligence
databases used to verify target information contained the correct
location of the Chinese Embassy. Third, nowhere in the target review
process was either of the first two mistakes detected. No one who
might have known that the targeted building was not the FDSP
headquarters -- but was in fact the Chinese Embassy -- was ever
consulted.

-- To help better understand the circumstances which led to the
mistaken bombing, let me offer a chronology of events.

Mistargeting:

-- The first major error stemmed from mislocating the intended target.

-- In March of this year, officers at the Central Intelligence Agency
began considering the Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement
(FDSP) as a potential target for NATO Allied Force strike operations.
The FDSP, because of its role in military procurement, was a
legitimate target.

-- We had a street address of the FDSP headquarters: "Bulevar
Umetnosti 2" in New Belgrade. But military forces require precise
geographic coordinates to conduct an attack with precision munitions.
During a mid-April selection and designation of the target, three maps
were used in an attempt to locate physically the address of the FDSP
headquarters: two local commercial maps from 1996 and 1989, and the
then most recent U.S. government map produced in 1997.

-- None of these maps had any reference to the FDSP building. And none
accurately identified the current location of the Chinese Embassy.

-- As you can see, the 1997 U.S. Government city map shows the Embassy
in Old Belgrade and depicts an unidentified building at the actual
Embassy site in New Belgrade. The 1996 commercial map made no
reference to the Embassy at either location. The 1989 map predated the
Embassy's move.

-- Please keep in mind that the location of the Chinese Embassy was
not a question that anyone would have asked when assembling this
particular target package since it was not connected in any way to our
intent to strike the FDSP headquarters.

-- In an effort to locate the FDSP building at Bulevar Umetnosti 2, an
intelligence officer in Washington used land navigation techniques
taught by the U.S. military to locate distant or inaccessible points
and objects. These techniques - which involve the comparison of
addresses from one street to another - can be used for general
geographic location, but are totally inappropriate for precision
targeting, and were used uniquely in this case. Using this process,
the individual mistakenly determined that the building which we now
know to be the Chinese Embassy was the FDSP headquarters. To use these
techniques for targeting purposes was a serious mistake. The true
location of the FDSP headquarters was some 300 meters away from the
Chinese Embassy. This flaw in the address location process went
undetected by all the others who evaluated the FDSP as a military
target.

-- Because this first error was so fundamental, let me walk you
through it.

-- The method for determining the location of the intended target --
the FDSP -- was seriously flawed. It was not based on certain
knowledge of the numbering sequence for addresses on the Bulevar
Umetnosti. Rather, our attempts to determine the location of the
building employed a method that is used in the field by the Army, but
is not normally used for aerial targeting purposes. The system will
provide an approximation of location, but cannot guarantee an accurate
geographic fix.

-- A 1997 National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) map was first
used to display the grid pattern of the streets in New Belgrade. Next,
in order to identify locations to use as reference points, they
identified and drew on the NIMA map to locate the Hyatt Hotel, the
Intercontinental Hotel, and the Serbian Socialist Party Headquarters.
Each of these buildings -- which were clearly labeled on the maps
being used -- were approximately one mile east of Bulevar Umetnosti.
Using these locations and their street addresses as reference points,
parallel lines were drawn that intersected both the known addresses
and Bulevar Umetnosti. In what proved to be a fundamental error, those
same numbers were then applied to locations on Bulevar Umetnosti,
assuming that streets were numbered in the same fashion along parallel
streets. The effectiveness of this method depends on the numbering
system being the same on parallel streets, that the numbers are odd
and even on the same sides of the street and that the street numbers
are used in the same parallel sequence even if the street names
change. Unfortunately, a number of these assumptions were wrong.

-- Using this approximation method, your embassy building was
designated as the target when in fact the Embassy was located on a
small side street at some distance on Bulevar Umetnosti from where the
intended target was actually located at number 2 Bulevar Umetnosti.
Let me show you a satellite photograph and some maps to illustrate the
method and the error it produced.

-- The identification of the building that actually was the Chinese
Embassy as the FDSP building subsequently and in error took on the
mantle of fact. It was not questioned nor reviewed up the chain of
command. This was in part because everyone involved had, as a result
of so many previously correct locations, assumed generally high
confidence in our procedures to locate, check and verify such
analytical facts. In this particular, and singular, case, our system
clearly failed. In part it failed also because every established
procedure in the review of this target was not followed.

-- Maps and satellite imagery were also analyzed to look for any
possible collateral damage issues near the target. There was no
indication that the targeted building was an embassy -- no flags, no
seals, no clear markings showed up. There were no collateral damage
issues in the vicinity.

Flawed Databases:

-- The second major error stemmed from flawed databases.

-- The incorrect location of the FDSP building was then fed into
several U.S. databases to determine whether any diplomatic or other
facilities off-limits to targeting were nearby. We do our best to
avoid damage to sensitive facilities such as embassies, hospitals,
schools and places of worship. Viewed from space, there was no
indication that the office building being targeted was an embassy. On
the satellite imagery available to U.S., there were no flags, seals,
or other markings to indicate that the building was an embassy. And
unfortunately, in this instance none of the database sources that were
checked correctly identified the targeted building as the Chinese
Embassy.

-- Multiple databases within the Intelligence Community and the
Department of Defense all reflected the Embassy in its pre-1996
location in Old Belgrade. Despite the fact that U.S. officials had
visited the Embassy on a number of occasions in recent years the new
location was never entered into intelligence or military targeting
databases. If the databases had accurately reflected the current
location of the Embassy, the mistaken identification of the FDSP
building would have been recognized and corrected.

-- Why was the Chinese Embassy not correctly located? It is important
to understand that our ability to verify the location of fixed targets
depends heavily on the accuracy of the databases, and the databases in
this case were wrong. Further, it is difficult to keep current
databases for cities around the globe. In general, diplomatic
facilities have been given relatively little attention in our efforts
to update our databases because such facilities are not targets.
Military targets are the top priority in these databases because of
the danger they pose to our own forces. Unfortunately, locations where
strikes should be avoided had lower priority and our databases
contained errors, notably in the failure to include the new location
of the Embassy of China.

-- Now, this is an important point, so let me expand upon it.

-- The databases which contained information about the physical
location of organizations in Belgrade -- including the so-called "no
hit list" of buildings that should not be targeted -- were faulty.

-- Although database maintenance is one the basic elements of our
intelligence efforts, it has been routinely accorded low priority.

-- The target and "no-hit" databases were not independently
constructed. Outdated information that placed the Chinese Embassy in
its former location in Old Belgrade was not updated when the Embassy
moved. Because various databases were not independently constructed,
this wrong information was duplicated. So when target information was
checked against the no-hit list, the error was not detected.

-- Many U.S. and other NATO diplomats must have visited the new
building. The address was in the phone book, the diplomatic list and
perhaps other sources, including Yugoslav maps. Certainly, many
citizens and officials of the United States were aware of the correct
location of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. However, in error, their
knowledge was not recorded in any of the military or intelligence
databases used in the targeting process.

-- In addition, the correct location of the Chinese Embassy was not
known to targeteers or NATO commanders because we were not, in fact,
looking for it. Since your Embassy was not a target, and because we
were unaware of any diplomatic or civilian facilities in the immediate
vicinity of the presumed FDSP building, no effort was made to verify
or precisely locate the whereabouts of your Embassy.

-- We have subsequently found some maps which show the correct current
location of the Chinese Embassy, although there are others, including
some produced in recent years by the Yugoslav government, which do
not.

-- Since the incident, the United States has updated its databases to
show the best known location of diplomatic facilities. The databases
will be updated as new information becomes available. Maps are out of
date almost as soon as they are printed. Databases can and should be
maintained to be effective.

Faulty Checks:

-- The third problem was faulty checks.  

-- Once the target was proposed, the focus of the review was on the
military value of the target, how best to attack it, and the issue of
collateral damage. No one in any of the succeeding reviews questioned
the accuracy of the location. The formal recommendation of the FDSP
target was forwarded in late April to military staffs both in the U.S.
and Europe, who were responsible for reviewing and identifying targets
for Operation Allied Force. Maps and satellite imagery were analyzed
to look for any possible collateral damage concerns near the target.
We conducted a target review in Europe, and again, no significant
risks to civilian or diplomatic facilities were uncovered.

-- Following submission by the European Command for approval, the
target package mistakenly received no additional examination outside
of the Defense Department. It did go through additional review at the
Pentagon, but this review found nothing different from the review that
took place in Europe. There were no known collateral damage concerns.
From that point on the building incorrectly identified as an FDSP
facility was included on a list of potential Allied Force strike
targets.

-- Some of our employees knew the location of the new Chinese Embassy.
But keep in mind that we were not looking for it, since the database
with the old location was assumed to be correct. None of these
individuals was consulted as the target was reviewed and, as a result,
we lost any opportunity to learn that the building targeted was the
new Chinese Embassy. We have also found one report from 1997 which
gave the correct address of the Chinese Embassy, but unfortunately the
correct address was not entered into the database.

-- To further explain:

-- Once the wrong target was selected, the system of checks that NATO
and U.S. command forces had in place to catch target errors did not
reveal the mistake. The database reviews conducted by the European
Command (EUCOM) were limited to validating the target data sheet
coordinates with the information put into the database by NIMA
analysts. Such a circular process could not uncover the original error
and exposes our susceptibility to a single point of database failure.

-- There has been much press coverage of the fact that the U.S. and
NATO relied on out-of-date maps to check targets. In fact, since any
physical map can quickly become out of date, the key question is one
of accurate databases. These were not properly maintained and did not
catch the error. Furthermore, persons familiar with the layout of the
city of Belgrade were not consulted in the construction of the target
and no-hit databases. They were also not involved in a review of this
target. This points up a flaw in our procedures.

-- The only question about the target information was raised by an
intelligence officer who had doubts as to whether the building
targeted was in fact the FDSP headquarters or might be some other
unidentified building. At no time was there any suspicion that the
building might be an embassy. This question was not raised to senior
levels and the strike went ahead.

-- Let me explain further this attempt by an intelligence officer to
question the reliability of the target information related to the
FDSP. There was information that suggested a discrepancy between the
selected target and the actual location of the FDSP. There was no
information that the target location was the Chinese Embassy, only
that it was perhaps the wrong building. However, there was a series of
frustrating miscommunications -- missed phone calls and lack of
follow-up -- which led to these doubts not being aired at a command
level in time to stop the attack. (The officer had doubts early on in
the process because of his own knowledge about the location of the
FDSP building; attempted to check with working-level contacts; was
continuing to check when the bombing happened; and was not able to
communicate his suspicions to senior officers.)

The Bombing:

-- The air strike then proceeded as planned on May 7 without any of
the mistakes having been detected or doubts about the reliability of
the target information having been addressed.

-- At 2146 Zulu (about midnight local time in Belgrade) on 7 May 1999
one of the fleet of B-2 bombers from Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB) in
Missouri dropped 5 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) 2000 lb.
GPS-guided bombs on the target designated as the FDSP building but
which was, in fact, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. All B-2 strikes
on Yugoslavia were flown from Whiteman AFB. The bombs were Global
Positioning System (GPS) guided weapons and operate in all weather and
at night using a satellite-based navigation system of a high order of
accuracy.

-- The air crews carried out their mission as planned. They had no
idea they were in fact bombing the Chinese Embassy. As a result, it is
obvious that they bear no responsibility for this failure; the
problem, as I have outlined, occurred earlier.

-- They had no way of seeing any identifying markers that would show
the building was an embassy. A flag in front of the building or any
such features would not be discernible at night and at the speeds and
altitudes at which our planes fly.

-- No other buildings in the immediate vicinity were hit. Our weapons
hit the target they were aimed at. Unfortunately, we did not realize
the true nature of the target.


To Review:

-- In summary, there were several crucial errors which led to the
Chinese Embassy being struck.

-- There was an error in locating the target. The approach used to
attempt to locate the FDSP building was severely flawed.

-- All sources of information used to prevent precisely this type of
accident were either inaccurate or incomplete.

-- The review process did not catch the locational error and did not
consult any material or any person which could have provided correct
information.

-- The United States is, as I speak, continuing to conduct an in-depth
review of this tragic accident. Based on our initial findings, it is
clear that this terrible mistake occurred not because of just one
organization, or because of any one individual.

-- There was in the immediate aftermath of the bombing some confusion
as to what had happened and some of our early public statements were
confused and contradictory. To summarize clearly and precisely: the
attack on the PRC Embassy was the result of a series of errors that
led to the destruction of the PRC Embassy instead of the Serb military
target that was intended. The use of a map containing an error -- the
inaccurate location of the Chinese Embassy -- contributed to the
tragic mistake -- but this was not due solely to a "map error."

-- What went wrong was, first and foremost, that the approach used to
locate the Bulevar Umetnosti 2, the address of the FDSP, was severely
flawed.

-- Second, the databases used to check and prevent this type of
targeting error were also inaccurate, incomplete, and not fully
independent.

-- And third, the target review process did not detect the first two
mistakes, nor did it involve people and information that could have
provided additional data to correct or detect these errors.

-- As the President has already expressed, we are deeply sorry that we
made these tragic errors.

-- Following the accident, the President of the United States and the
Secretary General of NATO separately expressed to China's leaders
their sincere apologies for the mistaken attack on the embassy and
their sympathy to the families of those who died and to the injured.

-- Our government has also undertaken corrective actions to prevent
mistakes like this from happening in the future.

-- New updated city maps have been published detailing locations of
diplomatic sites and other "no-strike" facilities in and around
Belgrade. Additionally, databases are being updated as changes occur.
We rely on these databases for our most current information, because
maps themselves are inevitably out of date the day or the week they
are published.

-- Intelligence and Defense organizations have strengthened their
internal mechanisms and procedures for selecting and verifying
targets, and have placed new priority on keeping our databases
current.

-- All U.S. Government sources will be required to report whenever
foreign embassies move or are established. This information will then
be forwarded and incorporated into our intelligence and military
databases.

-- The U.S. Government will seek direct contact with other governments
and interested organizations and persons to obtain their assistance in
identifying and locating facilities and places of interest or concern.

-- And as I noted earlier, we are continuing our internal reviews of
the causes of the accident, and when these reviews are completed, we
will determine whether any disciplinary action is called for.

U.S. Intentions:

-- I would like now to address various speculative theories that
appear to be held by some people in China.

-- We have heard that many people believe that our attack on your
Embassy was intentional.

-- Clearly the United States had absolutely no reason to want to
attack your protected embassy facility. Any such decision to bomb an
Embassy would have been contrary to U.S. doctrine and practice and
against international standards of behavior and established
international accords. No such decision was ever proposed or indeed
made.

-- Bombing the Chinese Embassy also would have been completely
antithetical to President Clinton's strong personal commitment to
strengthening the relationship between the United States and China; he
has defended this relationship and our engagement policy in the face
of vociferous domestic criticism. It is not imaginable that President
Clinton would make such a decision.

-- Moreover, bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade would have made
absolutely no sense in terms of our policy objectives in Kosovo. The
objective of the NATO bombing campaign was to diminish and degrade the
capacity of the Yugoslav government and military for repression in
Kosovo. The Embassy of China played no role in that set of activities.
It had always been the intention of the U.S. and NATO to bring the
Kosovo effort to conclusion through diplomatic efforts, including of
the G-8 and in the UN Security Council.

-- The accidental bombing of your Embassy not only intensified
international criticism of the NATO bombing campaign, it also had
negative effects on our diplomatic efforts, and affected in a deeply
negative fashion China's attitude and policies toward our effort in
Yugoslavia.

-- In particular, as Secretary Albright told Premier Zhu in April, we
always expected that China, as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, would need to be a part of the resolution of the Kosovo
crisis. We knew we would need China's support in this matter. Bombing
your Embassy was hardly the way to persuade you to help.

-- Thus, the bombing was contrary to two critically important U.S.
foreign policy goals: the further development of U.S.-China relations
and the resolution of the Kosovo situation.

-- I also have heard that some people in China subscribe to the theory
that the bombing was caused by one or several individuals working in
our government who conspired to subvert U.S.-China relations or who
may have concluded that China was too friendly to Belgrade or that the
Embassy was playing some role in assisting Belgrade.

-- We have found no evidence of an unauthorized conspiracy to attack
the Chinese Embassy, for any reason whatsoever, or of any "rogue
element" within the U.S. Government. The errors we have identified as
producing the accident took place in three separate and independent
areas. There was a series of three separate sets of events, some of
which affecting the databases occurred as far back as 1997, when no
one could have predicted this present set of circumstances. It is just
not conceivable, given the circumstances and errors committed, that
the attack could have been brought about by a conspiracy or by "rogue
elements."

-- Science has taught us that a direct explanation, backed up by full
knowledge of facts obtained through a careful investigation, is always
preferable to speculation and far fetched, convoluted or contrived
theories with little or no factual backing.

-- In this tragic case, the facts show a series of errors: that the
target was mislocated; the databases designed to catch mistakes were
inaccurate and incomplete; and none of the reviews uncovered either of
the first two errors.

Compensation:

-- The bombing of the embassy in Belgrade was a tragic accident
occurring during a time of ongoing hostilities in Yugoslavia. While
the action was completely unintended, the United States and NATO
nevertheless recognize that it was the result of a set of errors which
led to the embassy being mistakenly targeted.

-- In view of these circumstances, and recognizing the special status
of the diplomatic personnel who were affected, the United States
wishes to offer immediate ex gratia payments to those individuals who
were injured in the bombing and to the families of those killed, based
on current experience internationally for the scale of such payments.

-- I have asked Ambassador Sasser to discuss the particulars of this
offer on our part with you in the next few days.

-- As for the damage to the embassy property in Belgrade, this is
clearly a more complicated question. There is also the question of
damage suffered by U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities in China in
early May due to attacks by demonstrators.

-- Because of their complexity, these latter issues will need to be
examined with some care. We believe they too can be discussed through
diplomatic channels and are ready to do so at a mutually suitable
time.

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